Employer Status for Sexual Harassment Case in Florida
Employer Status for Sexual Harassment Case in Florida.
In 2001, the United States District Court Northern District of Florida heard a case involving a temporary help company that had supplied another company with a worker who later alleged sexual harassment and turned around and sued both companies. In Neal v. Manpower International, Inc. and Wayne-Dalton Corp., 2001 WL 1923127 (N.D.Fla.), Wayne-Dalton corporation is a company that manufactures garage doors. Id. Manpower is a temporary help company that pursuant to a contract provides temporary workers to Wayne-Dalton’s Pensacola, Florida location. Id. The facts are as follows.
As it relates to Wayne-Dalton, Manpower neither takes part in the management or operations of Wayne-Dalton. Id. Manpower has no authority or control over the Wayne-Dalton employees. Manpower does recruit and interview them, has an office at the Wayne-Dalton plant and provides the salaries. Id. Manpower does not unilaterally terminate an employee, rather it takes direction for terminations from Wayne-Dalton supervisors. Id. Manpower has a formal written policy prohibiting sexual harassment. Id. If Manpower receives a complaint of sexual harassment from a Wayne-Dalton employee, Manpower has its own internal investigation guidelines to follow. Id.
On June 22, 1999, Ms. Shneirdre Neal applied for a job with Manpower for the Wayne-Dalton facility. On the application she lied about a few things. If Manpower would have known of these lies, Manpower would have terminated her right away. Id. But, they did not find about them right away and she got the job. On June 24, 1999, she began working for Wayne-Dalton. Id. Ms. Neal was supervised in part by a Mr. Woodson who from day one sexually harassed her asking her if she had a boyfriend, that “she looked fine,” “to bend over,” “asking her what she was doing after work,” “asking her if she had a man,” and a few other things. Id.
On August 4, 1999, a confrontation occurred between Ms. Neal and a co-worker. Id. Then, later that day, Mr. Woodson called Ms. Neal into his office and told her she was doing a great job and to keep up the good work. Id. Then the next day Mr. Woodson singled out Ms. Neal for a minor incident that she claims he never did to anyone else. Id. On August 9, 1999, Ms. Neal went to talk to Manpower about Mr. Woodson. But, when she got there, Ms. Neal had found out that she had been fired by Wayne-Dalton. Id. She was told she was fired for poor performance. Id. She then told Manpower about the sexual harassment by Mr. Woodson. Id. A full investigation was conducted and Ms. Neal was asked to come in and discuss the matter. She never did and Manpower was informed that she had found other work. Id.
Ms. Neal then filed a complaint for sexual harassment and retaliation. Id. Manpower filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it was not Ms. Neal’s employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Id. The Appellate Court reviewed many cases which stood for the proposition that an employment agency is not plaintiff’s employer where it exercised no control over him as employee. Id. Ms. Neal tried to argue that under a borrowed servant doctrine or the joint employer doctrine, that Manpower was her employer. Id. But, the Appellate court did not agree for the following reasons. Id. Ms. Neal cited a 1997 case from North Carolina that did hold that a temporary staffing company could become an employer in certain circumstances. (cites omitted). Id. But, that the temporary service agency could only be held liable if there was a basis for holding the employer liable for the alleged harassment. Id. Holding “an employer is liable for sexual harassment created by a supervisor or other employee only if the employer knew or should have known of the illegal conduct and ailed to take prompt and remedial action. (cites omitted). Id.
Also, Ms. Neal argues that Manpower is liable under a ‘joint employer’ theory. Id. Again, under that theory, the court instructed that to be liable the “plaintiff must show that the defendant knew or should have known of the discriminatory conduct and that it failed to take those corrective measures within its control.” (cites omitted). Id. Ms. Neal tries to argue that Manpower should be held liable in that it was her employer and thus it did not need notice in that it was vicariously liable. Id. But, the Appellate Court did not agree. Id. The difference to the case at hand and the cases that Ms. Neal cited was that in both of those cases, the supervisors that did the harassing “were also employees of the same employer as the plaintiff and vicarious liability was assessed to the employers due to an agency relationship. (cites omitted). Id. In the case at hand, no such relationship exists. Id. Mr. Woodson was not an employee of Manpower. Id.
The Appellate Court for argument’s sake went on to determine that even if Manpower was considered Ms. Neal’s employer, the next question to answer was whether or not Manpower “took a tangible employment action against Ms. Neal.” Id. And the answer to this is no. Wayne-Dalton fired Ms. Neal, not Manpower.
Further, the Court went on to discuss that even if Manpower was considered her employer, it would still be granted summary judgment in that Ms. Neal admits that she never made Manpower aware of the sexual harassment. Id. And for the same reasons, the Court held that Manpower could not be sued for retaliation in that Ms. Neal could not establish all the elements that 1) she engaged in a protected activity, 2) her employer was aware of that activity, 3) an adverse employment action, and 4) a causal link. (cites omitted). Id.
Wayne-Dalton also filed a motion to dismiss. Id. The Appellate Court stated the guidelines Ms. Neal need to prove her case. That “1) she belongs to a protected group, 2) that she as been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature, 3) that the harassment was based on her sex, 4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment, and 5) a basis for holding the employer liable.” (cites omitted). Id. The court held that there was sufficient evidence on the record to maintain a cause of action for sexual harassment against Wayne-Dalton. Id. The actions by Mr. Woodson were severe and pervasive and all the other requirements were satisfied. Id.
Further, as to the retaliation claim, the Appellate Court held that Wayne-Dalton’s motion to dismiss was denied. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation Ms. Neal must prove “1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, 2) her employer was aware of that activity, 3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and 4) the adverse action was causally related to the protected activity.” (cites omitted). Id. Though the Appellate Court did discuss the fact that Ms. Neal’s case in this matter was not the strongest of cases, Ms. Neal at this point of time had submitted enough evidence to defeat Wayne-Dalton’s motion and that the issue of retaliation should be submitted to a jury. Id.
If you have been involved in a joint employer sexual harassment case that may involve more than one employer and you would like to find out the answers to your questions, please call and speak to joint employer sexual harassment lawyers Andrew S. Alitowski or William Ryan Moore at 888-ASK-ANDREW (275-2637). We are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
